War in outer space is coming: Why Switzerland should play a role

The risk of military escalation in space is growing. Switzerland should take a stance on this issue, writes Clémence Piorier.

Outer space is increasingly becoming a contested domain. Space actors, whether major powers or emerging spacefaring nations, are preparing for conflict in orbit at a level not seen since the Cold War. What is changing today is that outer space is no longer only a support domain for operations on Earth. It is emerging as a possible theatre of conflict in its own right. This trend is especially concerning because space is not just another arena of competition. It is a global common. A serious incident in space would not only affect satellites and astronauts but disrupt the many services on Earth that depend on space systems.

While this situation seems very far away from everyday Swiss politics, Switzerland is reliant on space infrastructure despite not having sovereign satellites. It means the security and safety of Swiss critical infrastructures rely on foreign space systems, which may be at risk of being attacked. Naturally, Switzerland is not going to take part in making space a more contested domain since it is obviously not in line with its policies nor does it have capabilities to destroy or disrupt satellites. However, as conflict might extend to space, Switzerland might extend its tradition of good offices to this new domain.

A crowded orbit, a fragile peace

What is the situation today?

Over the past two decades, counterspace capabilities have expanded significantly. States have tested anti-satellite missiles, carried out close and often unannounced maneuvers near foreign satellites, released subsatellites without warning, and developed highly maneuverable systems that can shadow or inspect another spacecraft. Many of these actions stop short of direct attack. But they are signals of power and intent. In that sense, they are comparable to military aircraft regularly approaching and crossing another state’s airspace: not yet war, but clearly not routine behavior either.

At the same time, space has become more accessible. The rise of commercial launch providers, private satellite operators, and new national space programs has transformed the sector. This “New Space” era has brought innovation, lower costs, and new services. But it has also made orbit more crowded and competitive. There are now more than 14,000 active satellites in space, along with millions of pieces of debris. Even an object as small as one centimeter can destroy a satellite of a few tons.

This congestion is dangerous. Orbital space is finite and can absorb only so many satellites and debris fragments before risks rise sharply. Once critical density is reached, collisions begin to produce debris faster than it can disperse, setting off a self-sustaining chain reaction of further collisions. This dynamic is known as Kessler Syndrome, a theoretical scenario in which the runaway accumulation of debris can render parts of orbit unusable. At some altitudes, early signs of this process are already emerging.

As more actors race to place satellites in orbit, they also compete for orbital positions and radio spectrum. No state can claim sovereignty in space, yet in practice, operators with very large constellations can occupy valuable orbital areas and make access harder for others. Congestion, competition, and insecurity are therefore becoming tightly linked.

What makes this even more troubling is the lack of effective arms control. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit, but it does not ban most other types of weapons or military operations in space. Since then, many diplomatic initiatives have tried to prevent an arms race in outer space. Yet these efforts have produced little concrete progress. This erosion of multilateralism and great power competition are the main reasons why space governance has fallen behind technological change.

Counterspace capabilities continue to advance. States are not only developing destructive anti-satellite weapons. They are also investing in electronic warfare, cyber tools, inspection satellites, robotic systems, and dual-use technologies that can serve both civilian and military purposes. A satellite designed for debris removal or servicing can also, in principle, capture or disable another spacecraft. This ambiguity is central to the problem. In space, it is often difficult to distinguish between a defensive capability and an offensive one.

That ambiguity fuels mistrust and drives a classic security dilemma. When one state develops a capability that it presents as protective, others may view it as threatening and respond in kind. The result is a cycle of action and reaction that pushes all actors toward greater militarization, even if none openly seeks conflict.

There are, however, still forces working against the full weaponization of outer space. One is technical interdependence. Even rivals remain tied together through shared infrastructure, international coordination bodies, and operational realities. Another is the growing concern over space sustainability. Decision-makers increasingly understand that space security and space sustainability are inseparable. Debris-generating actions can damage the orbital environment for everyone, including the actor that caused the harm.

This is why sustainability may become a more practical entry point for progress than traditional arms control. Rules on debris mitigation, information-sharing, and space traffic management are politically easier to discuss than bans on weapons. They do not solve the security problem, but they can reduce ambiguity, improve coordination, and lower the risk of miscalculation.

A role for Swiss good offices in space

The future could still evolve in several directions. One possibility is incremental progress through non-binding, technology-specific measures, such as moratoriums on destructive anti-satellite tests. Another is crisis-induced governance, in which a major or deadly debris incident finally forces governments to act. The worst scenario is the full weaponization of outer space, where competition continues unchecked, counterspace capabilities are routinely deployed, and conflict in orbit becomes reality. Whichever path emerges, one reality is already clear: space can no longer be treated as politically separate from Earth.

This is precisely why there is also an opening for mediation and facilitation. In a domain marked by mistrust, ambiguity, and the absence of rules for space operations, there is growing need for actors able to foster dialogue, clarify intentions, and help de-escalate tensions.

In the civilian domain, there is no Space Traffic Management in orbit, thus there are no defined rules for space operations to avoid collisions between satellites. Operators even struggle to contact each other and often disagree on the required threshold that should prompt a collision avoidance maneuver and, if relevant, who has to maneuver. In the military domain, a maneuver can be easily misinterpreted and increase tensions between two rivals and trigger responses with potentially irreversible effects. Switzerland could leverage its neutrality status to ensure communications between operators and offer mediation services.

It will help Switzerland to assert itself as a trusted mediator on the global stage in a time when many new mediators are emerging in conflicts on Earth (e.g., Qatar, UAE, Pakistan, etc.). Swiss good offices in space cannot replace arms control, nor can it resolve strategic rivalry between major powers. But it can help create channels of communication, support confidence-building, and facilitate dialogue before and after incidents in orbit. Such mediation may lead to common practices of space operations, which may eventually become norms and rules to be adopted at the international level, potentially unlocking stalled UN processes.

Read more about Swiss mediation in space here:

Edited by Benjamin von Wyl/ds