Caught between the US and China, can Switzerland stay neutral in the AI race?

A “Make Switzerland Neutral Again” cap at a Pro Suisse meeting in Bern in April 2026. The issue of neutrality lies at the heart of the national vote on September 27. Keystone / Anthony Anex

The debate over neutrality is particularly heated in Switzerland ahead of a vote on the issue on September 27. But what does it mean to be neutral in a world where artificial intelligence, cloud services and digital infrastructure increasingly depend on the United States and China?

For more than two centuries, Swiss neutrality has defined Switzerland’s position in armed conflicts. On September 27, Swiss voters will decide whether to enshrine a more restrictive interpretation of neutrality in the Constitution limiting the country’s ability to impose sanctions on belligerent states outside those decided by the United Nations Security Council.

Whatever the outcome of the vote, the question of how to remain neutral in a world in which artificial intelligence (AI) and other strategically important technologies are controlled by two rival powers – the United States and China – is as pressing as ever. This issue is particularly sensitive for Switzerland, which depends heavily on technologies developed by both countries. 

“If you are in the middle, you get caught in the crossfire,” says Jean-Marc Rickli, head of global and emerging risks at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

Driven by economic competition and geopolitical tensions, the US and China are accelerating the development of increasingly powerful AI systems, even “at the expense of security,” Rickli says. The rise of advanced, autonomous agentic AI models is an example.

“With agents, you have new entities that are potentially able to develop and carry out their own plan, including staging their own attack without human intervention, in order to reach their assigned goal. And this is something completely new,” Rickli says. In this environment, he believes the danger of mistakes or escalation is becoming more tangible.

Maxime Stauffer, co-founder and CEO of the Simon Institute for Longterm Governance, a Geneva-based think tank, believes that advances in frontier AI are changing the cyberspace threat landscape.

“Day to day, various states and non-state actors launch cyberattacks on each other. That’s known and almost routine. But there used to be an equilibrium between offense and defence capabilities, which AI is now disrupting,” he says.

The growing US-China rivalry over AI has even prompted comparisons with a new “Cold War”, although the analogy remains contestedExternal link.

Despite the calls, neither Washington nor BeijingExternal link appears willing to slow down the AI race. “We’re leading China in AI (…) and frankly, I want to keep it that way because whoever wins AI, wins,” US President Donald Trump said recentlyExternal link. China, for its part, has dismissed calls to slow down the development of AI, calling them “fearmongering” and part of a “Cold War playbook”.

Both countries use access to their technology, sanctions and industrial dependencies for geopolitical leverage. In this context, remaining equidistant between Washington and Beijing is becoming “increasingly difficult,” Rickli says, “because you have to choose a side, in order to avoid potential sanctions”.

According to the Swiss State Secretariat for Security Policy (SEPOS), US and Chinese companies’ growing influence over countries’ economic and military capabilities and the conduct of warfare is “jeopardising strategic stability”.

>>Here is everything you need to know about the upcoming neutrality on September 27:

The law of neutrality also applies in cyberspace

Does this mean Swiss neutrality has become irrelevant in the digital world?

From the perspective of international law, the answer is no. “The fact that the law of neutrality was codified before the advent of cyberspace and artificial intelligence does not mean that it does not apply in these areas,” says Marco Roscini, professor of international law at the University of Westminster in London and an expert on neutrality and armed conflict.

Roscini explains that the general rules governing armed conflict – reflected in the United Nations Charter, the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions and Protocols – remain binding regardless of the technology employed. This was established by the International Court of Justice in a 1996 advisory opinionExternal link. What matters, therefore, is how technologies are used as means or methods of warfare.

For Switzerland, this entails both legal protection and obligations. In the event of a war between China and the United States, for example, Bern would have to take feasible measures to stop either side from using cyber infrastructure on Swiss territory to conduct hostilities against the other.

“Cyberspace is not an abstraction. Clouds, cables, satellites, data centres, servers, computers and the people who use them still have a physical location,” Roscini says.

SEPOS notes, however, that the application of international legal norms to new technologies – including in cyberspace and outer space – is in some respects unclear, or that governments prevent such norms from becoming established.

Sovereignty rather than technological neutrality

Much of Switzerland’s technological dilemma, according to the experts interviewed, does not actually concern the law of neutrality. Dependence on US and Chinese software, digital services or AI systems is primarily a question of sovereignty and strategic autonomy.

The law of neutrality, Roscini points out, primarily applies to the state, not private companies. Switzerland has long taken advantage of the absence of general trade restrictions to do business while remaining neutral. During the Second World War, for example, Swiss companies continued trading with belligerent states, especially Nazi Germany, despite the country’s neutral status.

For to Eugenio Benincasa, a senior cybersecurity researcher at the Center for Security Studies of the Swiss federal technology institute ETH Zurich, a similar strategy characterises Switzerland’s relations with China and the United States today. Switzerland maintains substantial economic relations with both, benefiting from each without fully aligning itself with either side. But this technological dependence, while not in itself compromising Swiss neutrality, “limits the country’s room for manoeuvre,” Benincasa says.

The initiative being put to a vote on September 27 could further limit Switzerland’s room for manoeuvre. By severely restricting Bern’s ability to impose sanctions on belligerent states, it could have repercussions for the country’s reputation and economic interests, according to the Swiss governmentExternal link. Switzerland would no longer be able to join numerous sanctions against countries at war, with the exception of those decided by the United Nations Security Council, where the United States, China and Russia each have veto power.

>>Here’s how the Swiss arms industry has capitalised on neutrality:

To strengthen its digital sovereignty, Benincasa believes Switzerland should seek to reduce dependencies in the most sensitive sectors, such as critical infrastructure, public administration, defence, intelligence and healthcare. And where Swiss alternatives are unavailable, the country should at least rely on European technologies.

In practice, Switzerland already makes different calculations depending on the technology and the supplier, Benincasa says. In the case of Palantir, a US company specialising in data analytics and security technologies, several Swiss public institutions, including the armed forces, have decided against using its software, partly because of concerns over sovereignty and national security. In other sectors, by contrast, Chinese technologies such as Huawei’s cost-competitive telecommunications infrastructure can be particularly difficult to replace.

“Asymmetric assessments are made based on what the two countries can offer,” Benincasa says. “Talking about complete technological independence is a utopia.”

The diplomacy card

There is, however, one area in which Swiss neutrality could be an asset: diplomacy, not least thanks to the presence of intergovernmental organisations based in Geneva. Historically, neutrality has enabled neutral states to help prevent conflicts from escalating and offer good offices, mediation and humanitarian assistance.

Maxime Stauffer of the Simon Institute in Geneva says Switzerland’s status as a neutral state still helps create space for dialogues on AI amid rapid technological developments and geopolitical tensions. 

Stauffer mentions possible areas for such dialogue, including maintaining communication channels to reduce the risk of unintended escalation involving autonomous systems and setting boundaries on AI use against critical infrastructure. 

The Swiss foreign ministry has not confirmed the existence of any official Swiss mediation between the US and China on artificial intelligence. But if Switzerland’s current approach to neutrality can genuinely help it mitigate the risks of cyberwar between the two technological powers, it may be less outdated than some might think.

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Edited by Gabe Bullard/sb