What Switzerland can achieve with its 2026 OSCE chairmanship 

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is a shadow of its former self. Switzerland, which will chair the OSCE next year, must prepare for a range of very different scenarios, writes the former secretary general, Thomas Greminger. 

The OSCE has been completely polarised for years. However, field missions in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and Central Asia continue to do valuable work. This can also be said of the secretariat’s advisory activities in the field of transnational threats – human trafficking, violent extremism and terrorism, cyber security – and the work of its centres of competence for human rights, the rule of law and democracy, national minorities, and freedom of the media. 

But in political terms, the organisation’s dialogue platforms are blocked. It plays no role in conflict management in Ukraine and has disappeared from the political radar of key Euro-Atlantic security actors. 

It is quite possible that this will remain the dominant character of the organisation for which Switzerland will bear political responsibility next year. This would mean that the political room for manoeuvre is very limited and that the primary concern is to ensure the survival of the organisation for better times. 

There would be no great foreign policy laurels to be earned in this situation. But even in this scenario, with good preparation and intelligent diplomacy, modest institutional reforms and individual substantive priorities would be possible. I am thinking here of the fight against disinformation, security in cyberspace, or the nexus between new technologies (artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology) and security. 

Can the OSCE become a central player again? 

What makes preparing for Switzerland’s third OSCE chairmanship after 1996 and 2014 so challenging, however, is the uncertainty surrounding developments in the political environment. Should the war in Ukraine come to an end in the coming months, the OSCE would have the opportunity – possibly in a joint operation with the United Nations – to take a role in monitoring the ceasefire. Should this succeed, the OSCE would once again be a central player in European security. 

A ceasefire in conjunction with an agreement on principles of conflict resolution would create the initial conditions for supplementing military deterrence with certain elements of co-operative security in the European security order. Mechanisms for military risk reduction and confidence- and security-building measures would be needed quickly to stabilise the enormously long dividing line between Russia and Europe. In a highly armed Europe, conventional arms control would soon have to be negotiated again. 

In the non-military sphere, there would be elections to observe, minority rights to safeguard and media freedom to restore in a post-conflict context. As the most inclusive European security organisation, the OSCE has a great deal of experience and suitable instruments in all these areas. 

The challenge for the Swiss chairmanship is to position the OSCE tools politically at the appropriate moment and to ensure that the organisation can deliver them when they are requested. Both tasks are anything but trivial given the organisation’s political marginalisation and extremely scarce resources. 

One solution could be to seek new coalitions among countries that are not willing to join the poles. This was already a successful model in the CSCE process: the so-called N+N states, the neutrals and non-aligned, repeatedly succeeded in mediating between the major powers. 

Anticipating different scenarios 

Swiss foreign policy must therefore prepare for very different realities. Strategic foresight and anticipation are required: policy options must be thought through for different scenarios. An uncertain future requires even better preparation for all aspects that can be planned. 

Our experience in the chairmanship year in 2014 confirmed this, when we unexpectedly, but ultimately successfully, had to deal with the crisis in and around Ukraine. It became clear how important it is to make quick decisions via short channels in Bern and Vienna to be able to react flexibly to developments and mobilise reserves if necessary. 

It is therefore quite possible that our country’s OSCE chairmanship in 2026 will be a rather arduous and unglamorous affair. But even then, Switzerland will be expected to commit itself to the continued existence of the OSCE and the remaining elements of co-operative security in Europe. 

Things could also turn out differently, however. Developments in Ukraine are opening new opportunities for the reconstruction of European security, and Switzerland, as chair of the OSCE, has important levers at its disposal to help shape this process – an opportunity that must be seized. 

Adapted from German by Catherine Hickley/ds