Swiss immigration debate revives Brexit parallels

Nigel Farage, then leader of the anti-immigration, pro-Brexit UKIP party, stands in front of a campaign poster on June 23, 2016. In the UK, many believed that the number of migrants arriving would fall following Brexit. However, the opposite has happened. EPA/FACUNDO ARRIZABALAGA

Brexit has had unexpected consequences for migration. As Switzerland debates an initiative aimed at reducing immigration that could jeopardise the free movement of people with the European Union, some are calling for lessons to be learnt from what has happened across the Channel.

On June 14, Swiss voters will decide on an initiative by the right-wing Swiss People’s Party aimed at limiting immigration. Entitled ‘No to a ten-million Switzerland!’External link, the proposal calls on the Federal Council and parliament to prevent the permanent resident population from reaching ten million by 2050.

To achieve this, it proposes restrictions on asylum and family reunification and does not rule out, as a last resort, terminating the agreement on the free movement of persons with the EU.

>> You can find an explanation of the initiative, as well as the positions of the different camps, in the article below:

Immigration fears drove Brexit vote

No country has so far used immigration restrictions to cap its population. There is, however, a precedent for leaving free movement behind: the United Kingdom. As the campaign gathers pace in Switzerland, some observers are turning to the only country that has effectively abandoned this migration regime by leaving the European Union.

It was almost exactly ten years ago that the British voted in favour of Brexit on June 23, 2016External link, to the surprise of almost everyone. The UK officially left the EU more than four years later, on January 1, 2021.

Post-election analyses showed that concerns about immigration had been a decisive factorExternal link. In the years leading up to the vote, net migration from the EU – particularly from Central and Eastern Europe – rose sharply following the 2004 and 2008 enlargements, peaking in 2014.

The slogan “Take back control”, repeatedly used by Brexit supporters at the time, strongly echoes arguments now advanced by the Swiss People’s Party, which says immigration is “out of controlExternal link”.

Cenni Najy, head of politics at the Centre Patronal business leaders’ association and an opponent of the People’s Party initiative, sees “striking parallels”. “The migration issue facing Switzerland today is similar to the one that was at the heart of discussions during the Brexit campaign,” he says.

Immigration has surged in UK following Brexit

In the UK, many believed that migrant arrivals would fall if the country left the EU. However, “the impact of Brexit itself was not to reduce migration overall”, says Jonathan Portes, a professor of economics and public policy in the Department of Political Economy at King’s College London. “In fact, it was quite the opposite: the post-Brexit system that the government introduced did result in a net increase in migration overall.”

Immigration from the EU and EFTA (Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway) began to slow as early as 2016, even before the UK formally left the EU. “Brexit discouraged Europeans from coming here,” Portes told Swissinfo. The slowdown became even more pronounced after freedom of movement ended.

From 2021, this was replaced by a new system designed to make it easier for third-country nationals to access the labour market and obtain student visas. The change came against a backdrop of labour shortages linked to the post-Covid recovery and the arrival of large numbers of refugees from Hong Kong and Ukraine.

UK immigration before and after Brexit

Before Brexit: As an EU member state, the UK already had a degree of autonomy over immigration policy, particularly regarding non-EU nationals. Employers wishing to recruit someone from a non-EU country had to sponsor them.

EU citizens, however, could live and work in the UK without a visa thanks to freedom of movement. The country did, however, benefit from several EU opt-outs relating to migration and border controls.

Post-Brexit: Since 2021, London has operated a new points-based immigration systemExternal link that treats Europeans and non-Europeans equally. Various visas have been introduced, with priority given to skilled jobs, although there are some exceptions for care workers and seasonal workers.

The new system has made it more difficult for EU citizens to move to the UK, whereas they had previously been free to settle there. Conversely, it has made it easier for people from non-EU countries to immigrate, particularly international students and their families.

More non-European immigration

“In the years that followed, the decline in immigration from Europe was more than offset by a very large rise in migration from outside the EU,” says Portes.

Faced with widespread discontent, the British government has since tightened its immigration policy, particularly with regard to family reunification. The latest figures, published in 2025, show that net migration has returned to its pre-Brexit level.

However, its composition is now very different, notes the Oxford Migration ObservatoryExternal link: immigration from non-EU countries remains significantly higher than before Brexit, while immigration from the EU has fallen sharply. Today, most migrants come from India, China, Pakistan and NigeriaExternal link.

Rise in unauthorised boat arrivals

Furthermore, one category has not declined: asylum-seekers. Their numbers have surged since 2021, peaking at more than 110,000External link in autumn 2025. Between 2004 and 2020, the figure ranged between 22,000 and 46,000 per year.

This rise is largely due to the increase in crossings of the English Channel in small boats. According to the Migration ObservatoryExternal link, nearly 46,000 people attempted the crossing in 2022, compared with around 300 in 2018. A second peak, of around 42,000 crossings, was recorded in 2025. In early May, the UK Home Office said that more than 200,000 peopleExternal link had attempted the crossing since 2018, almost all of them to seek asylum.

Portes believes that Brexit only partly explains the increase. Other factors have also been put forward, such as tighter controls at European borders and the lower cost of crossings organised by people smugglers.

However, since leaving the EU, the UK can no longer return asylum-seekers to the first EU country they entered, as was previously possible under the Dublin Regulation. More broadly, cooperation with the EU has become more difficult. “Leaving the EU has limited the UK’s ability to tackle irregular migration,” concludes a European Parliament briefing noteExternal link.

Critics warn Switzerland could face similar pressures

Najy at the business leaders’ association believes that Switzerland could experience a “similar migration substitution effect” if the initiative were accepted. “If the United Kingdom, which is an island, is already struggling to control irregular migration flows, one can reasonably ask what the situation would be in Switzerland, which does not have the capacity to monitor every square metre of its land border with neighbouring countries,” he says.

He predicts that the “adjustment variable” in Switzerland would also be cross-border workers living in neighbouring countries, who are not covered by the initiative. More than 400,000 people already work in Switzerland under this system.

“If this initiative is implemented, there will be a strong temptation among politicians to try to fill labour shortages with cross-border workers,” he says. This could also involve people employed under more precarious or temporary arrangements, who would not be entitled to family reunification. In short, “we would be moving away from one migration system only to create another, one that is more chaotic, less European and less regulated than the one we have today.”

People’s Party rejects Brexit comparison

Nicolas Kolly, a lawmaker from the People’s Party, says comparisons between his party’s initiative and Brexit are misplaced. “Our initiative is not a Swiss Brexit,” he says. He argues that the proposal could be implemented without ending the free movement of persons, “by focusing first on asylum, family reunification and safeguard clauses”.

Kolly also says Switzerland would still be able to recruit the skilled workers it needs. “Even with the initiative, around 40,000 people a year could still immigrate,” he says.

The politician adds that high levels of immigration have not solved labour shortages and are also creating additional demand for housing, healthcare and transport. Reliance on cross-border workers is itself a “knock-on effect” of free movement: “A significant number of cross-border workers come to Switzerland to deal with work generated directly by immigration,” he writes.

For Kolly the example of the UK primarily shows that the country failed to pursue a “coherent” migration policy after Brexit. He argues that by setting a demographic target, his party’s initiative would instead establish a “clear course”, helping to avoid simply shifting migration flows elsewhere.

Experts warn there’s no simple fix

For Portes of King’s College London, it would indeed be simplistic to claim that Brexit has increased immigration and to use this argument to conclude that the Swiss People’s Party initiative is a bad idea.

He believes, however, that the British example illustrates the limits of promising the electorate a “magic, pain-free way” that will “magically reduce immigration”. “That is a fantasy,” he says. “The economic pressures, demographic pressures, shortages in particular sectors – Brexit may have shifted the way that we dealt with them but it didn’t eliminate them.”

“Migration is a complex phenomenon,” he insists. “You actually have to grapple with difficult [political and economic] trade-offs when you’re setting migration policy […] and the same, of course, is true for Switzerland.” In his view, the main lesson of Brexit is perhaps that governments have less control over these dynamics than they think.

Edited by Samuel Jaberg. Adapted from French by Patrick Julian Huwyler/gw