In Eastern Europe corruption lies at heart of polarisation

In the countries of Eastern Europe, polarisation often has more to do with the criminal ties of one or other political camp than with policy issues. International democracy promoters should take note of this.

A spectre is haunting Europe: polarisation. Ongoing animosity and lack of political trust are undermining the ability of politics to reach consensus, thereby jeopardising the very workings of democracy.

However, polarisation as found in Western and in Eastern Europe is not driven by the same phenomena. In some contexts, policy issues are at stake, while in others it is mainly about corruption and the erosion of democracy and the rule of law.

If international democracy promoters fail to distinguish between these two pathologies of democracy, they may end up pursuing the wrong cure.

Polarisation in Germany, France and Poland

Traditional polarisation can currently be seen in Europe’s major democracies: Germany, France and Poland. It is becoming increasingly difficult there to find majorities, and depending on the political constellation – for example, with a conservative president and a liberal prime minister, as is currently the case in Poland – the search for consensus becomes a challenge.

In this situation, it suddenly becomes all right to chip away at democratic norms, for in polarised countries, more and more citizens are calling into question the acceptability of the other political camp.

Crime at the heart of another polarisation

We are familiar with the animosities and violation of democratic norms in various other countries in Eastern Europe, such as Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovakia and Hungary – all states with major corruption problems.

The term “corruption” may seem to trivialise the problem, for we are not talking about everyday corruption, such as bribes to traffic police, but rather about close ties between parts of the political community and organised crime and the large-scale embezzlement of public funds. These are at the heart of this polarisation.

Needless to say, other politicians and civil society in these countries are rebelling against the situation.

Ten months of protests in Serbia

For the past ten months, students in Serbia have been protesting for the rule of law and against a political context where the ruling party exploits the state for its own purposes. Infrastructure projects are awarded to government-affiliated companies at inflated prices and then poorly executed. The collapse of the railway station canopy in Novi Sad cost 16 lives; according to the indictment, over €100 million (CHF93 million) had been embezzled.

No issue divides the ruling and opposition parties as much as the question of the rule of law. Behind some construction companies that have prospered thanks to government contracts stand individuals who are suspected of playing a double game in politics and organised crime.

This includes drug trafficking, illegal arms exports, the murder of an opposition politician and an attack on the Kosovo police, the last two in northern Kosovo. The links may reach even higher: photos of President Aleksandar Vučić’s son with prominent figures in organised crime have recently surfaced. Leaked chat histories point to the involvement of the president and his brother with the mafia.

Impact of criminal activity in Moldova and Georgia

The criminal dealings of politicians with “businessmen”, as they are euphemistically called, can bring entire economies to the brink of ruin. Moldova has still not fully recovered from the banking scandal of 2014. At that time, the three largest banks stole 12% of the gross domestic product through fraudulent transactions.

The oligarchs behind the banking scandal are now the political opponents of the reformist president Maia Sandu.

In Georgia, the oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili founded and finances the current ruling party, Georgian Dream, and thus de facto single-handedly controls the government, under which the country is becoming increasingly authoritarian. These conflicts have much in common with polarisation. They inevitably lead to a mutual loss of trust, with political opponents no longer being regarded as legitimate.

But this is where the parallels with ideological polarisation end. When parties are banned in Moldova, it is not mainly because of their positions on substantive issues, even if those concerned like to portray themselves as victims of a ban on the freedom of opinion.

Political assassinations in Slovakia

Conflicts often leave the parliamentary arena and end up in court or are fought out on the streets. In Slovakia, the demonisation of political opponents and critical media workers culminated in 2018 in the murder of well-known investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his partner Martina Kušnírová. Six years later, the left-wing authoritarian prime minister Robert Fico was the victim of an assassination attempt.

The term “polarisation” suggests a symmetrical conflict, but in all the countries discussed here the political threats and violence can primarily be traced back to one party. The two attacks in Slovakia are prime examples: Fico’s assailant was apparently a politically motivated but rather confused lone wolf, while the intrigues behind the journalist’s murder extend to business circles. The Slovak press reports evidence of links to politics, including the former and current prime minister Fico.

So anyone who, by analogy with ideologically polarised party systems, complains about a lack of willingness to engage in dialogue and compromise, may be trivialising the problem and belittling the victims.

Ideology plays secondary role

Ideology is, if anything, a by-product. Bosnian Serb politician Milorad Dodik uses Serbian nationalism to deflect attention from his abuse of powerExternal link. In Hungary, Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party is planning campaigns against George Soros and LGBTQ rights, with the aim of dividing the opposition and distracting from the poor economic situation and corruption. As for long-time former Montenegrin leader Milo Đukanović and his Democratic Socialist Party, the formula for his 30-year autocratic rule was based on clientelism, vote buying and the issue of national independence. Đukanović labelled all other parties either as pro-Serbian or as open to cooperation with pro-Serbian parties – in other words, traitors to independence. This secured his electoral advantage, while in reality he was entangled with the mafia.

Orban, Dodik and Đukanović have one thing in common: all three have undergone a striking ideological shift in the course of their political careers. It is therefore highly probable that their ideology is mainly driven by strategic calculations.

Serbia’s ruling party is still tainted by its legacy from the Yugoslav Wars. But today, the party thrives on a fairly ideology-free promise of growth, a near-monopoly on television coverage, and clientelism, which also helps it to retain voters. It now only sporadically resorts to nationalism in order to overcome crises.

Georgia’s ruling party took credit for the country’s EU candidate status in the 2024 elections. In doing so, it appropriated the opposition’s main claim, thereby averting any differentiation on substantive issues. This was, however, a ruse: even before the elections, the party’s abuse of power was already an obstacle to EU negotiations. After the elections, the government slammed the door on the EU.

What this means for international democracy promoters in Eastern Europe

The political history of smaller Western European countries rests on a tried-and-tested formula for combating polarisation – through dialogue and compromise. The Swiss magic formula for consensus-type governments attests to this today. And although these methods are now highly disputed in Western Europe itself, for example in France or Germany, international players in Eastern Europe often strive to promote dialogue and compromise.

But in light of the second face of polarisation, the call to dialogue throws the opposition and civil society into a dilemma. It is true that, even in corruption-plagued countries with mafia structures, dialogue and pacts can sometimes lead to re-democratisation and a strengthening of the rule of law. This is what happened in North Macedonia, for example. There, corruption and a wiretapping scandal in 2015 first led to protests, but then to an agreement between the government and the opposition on the establishment of a special prosecutor’s office and new elections until a change of government. But this presupposes that the ruling party, or at least part of it, is willing to embrace genuine reforms and relinquish power. On the whole, however, dialogue and compromise cannot be prescribed as a universal cure.

Anyone who enters into dealings with organised crime risks having their hands tainted with blood.

If the international community presses the opposition and civil society to engage in talks, it risks merely discrediting them. In North Macedonia, dialogue produced results in 2015 – because the international community pressured the prime minister to resign and to agree to a transitional cabinet and criminal investigations.

Edited by Benjamin von Wyl. Adapted from German by Julia Bassam/gw.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of Swissinfo.