Swiss drone defence: ‘We’re flying partly blind’

Switzerland needs to take the threat from drones more seriously, according to security expert Ivo Capaul. Keystone/DPA/Moritz Frankenberg

A drone suddenly appears over an airfield or nuclear power plant. Is it the mistake of a hobbyist or an act of espionage? According to security expert Ivo Capaul, Switzerland lacks a clear picture of the threat.

Swiss public broadcaster SRF: Is the danger posed by drones in Switzerland being underestimated?

Ivo Capaul: Generally speaking, yes. In Switzerland, we have lost some sense of the current threat situation. We certainly need to take this issue seriously and address it.

SRF: How serious is the problem? How often do potentially dangerous drones fly over critical infrastructure, for example?

I.C.: In a sense, we’re flying blind. There is no national, centralised record of drone sightings. Although the army records incidents, it is not always clear what is behind the figures.

According to the army, around 80% of cases involve misidentifications or drones operated by harmless hobbyists. In 20% of cases, it could be a hybrid attack by a state.

Ivo Capaul, security expert

Ivo Capaul is a researcher in the Defence Policy and Armaments Team at the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) at the federal technology institute ETH Zurich.

SRF: How difficult is it to distinguish between a harmless drone and a hostile one?

I.C.: It’s not that simple. These days a commercial drone effectively has a virtual number plate and is registered. A sensor can identify it. But a malicious actor can assemble a drone themselves using off-the-shelf parts or tamper with the control system. This makes identification difficult and requires sophisticated radar sensors.

SRF: What would be the most important steps to take to get out of this “blind flight” situation?

I.C.: It is important to install sensors at critical infrastructure sites so that we can detect what is happening in the sky. Furthermore, there needs to be a reporting obligation for operators of critical infrastructure, similar to that for cyber-attacks.

They must report any drones they spot. This is the only way we can obtain a picture of the national situation on which we can take action.

SRF: What are the main aims of state actors that carry out drone flights over critical infrastructure?

I.C.: Often people think it’s all about sabotage: a drone loaded with explosives that flies into a target. But in the context of hybrid operations a drone can pursue a wide variety of objectives: espionage, testing a facility’s security measures, delegitimising the security authorities or sowing uncertainty among the public. The spectrum is very broad.

SRF: Who is operating these drones?

I.C.: Attribution is very difficult and time-consuming. The case at Leipzig Airport, where Germany clearly identified Russia as the perpetrator, is an exception. In most cases, it cannot be conclusively proven whether a state actor is behind it, or which one.

SRF: The war in Ukraine shows just how rapidly drone technology is developing. Is it possible to protect yourself effectively?

I.C.: There is no such thing as absolute security, nor will there ever be. It would be illusory to believe that every sensitive site in Switzerland could be protected by a defence system. That is why we must prioritise. Where is the threat greatest?

We must also strengthen our own defences, for example through structural measures. A protective net can shield critical infrastructure from espionage or sabotage. Resilience is also important, such as the ability to resume normal operations quickly following an attack.

Translated from German, sub-edited by Alexandra MV Andrist/sb

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